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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the advantages of opt-out plans, 
and identifies a critical shortcoming in Copyright’s doctrine 
of Fair Use.  The discussion is fueled by a current 
controversy:  In December of 2004, Google, Inc. announced 
its plan to digitally scan thousands of copyrighted books as 
part of a massive new digital indexing service.  Hedging 
against possible litigation, Google provided a free and easy 
opt-out procedure for authors who didn’t want their books 
scanned.  Despite this measure, two major authors’ groups 
have sued Google, claiming the opt-out plan imposes an 
unfair burden. This article explores the fairness of 
established opt-outs in contract law, privacy law, and class 
action rules.  Further, the discussion explores how 
Copyright already places similar burdens upon authors.  
Ultimately, these lessons are applied to the Google Book 
Search problem, and an important new Fair Use  
consideration is identified. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In December of 2004, Google, Inc. announced its plan to 
copy thousands of books protected by American copyright law.1
Google Book Search (formerly the Google Print Library Project) 
would require years of labor, the world’s most advanced scanning 
technology, and the cooperation of Harvard, Stanford, and Oxford 
Universities, as well as the University of Michigan and the New 
York Public Library.2 What was not required, Google believed, 
was the express permission of copyright owners. 
 After being sued by The Author’s Guild in September of 
2005, Google offered a public explanation for why its massive 
copying project did not constitute “massive copyright 
infringement”:3 The project’s purpose was to help people find 
books, not steal them.4 When presented with a search query, 
Google’s book search engine would look within its full-text 
database to locate pertinent titles.  Relevant page snippets (only a 
few lines long) would be presented to the user, along with 
information about where to buy the books.5 Google claimed their 
indexing system was protected fair use.6
1 Press Release, Google, Inc., Google Checks Out Library Books (Dec. 14, 
2004), at http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/print_library.html. 
2 Id.
3 Press Release, The Author’s Guild, Author’s Guild Sues Google, Citing 
“Massive Copyright Infringement” (Sept. 20, 2005), at 
http://www.authorsguild.org/news/sues_google_citing.htm. 
4 See Google Books Library Project – An enhanced card catalog of the world’s 
books, at http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (“The Library 
Project’s aim is simple: make it easier for people to find relevant books – 
specifically books they wouldn’t find any other way such as those that are out of 
print – while carefully respecting authors’ and publishers’ copyrights.  Our 
ultimate goal is to work with publishers and libraries to create a comprehensive, 
searchable, virtual card catalog of all books in all languages that helps users 
discover new books and publishers discover new readers.”). 
5 See Id. (“When you click on a search result for a book from the Library 
Project, you’ll see the Snippet View which, like a card catalog, shows you 
information about the book plus a few snippets – a few sentences of your search 
term in context.  You may also see the Sample Pages View if the publisher or 
author has given us permission or the Full Book View if the book is out of 
copyright.”).   
6 See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW (2nd ed. BNA Books, 1995).  Fair use is a doctrine in American copyright 
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Supplementing Google’s fair use claims, however, was an 
even more interesting justification:  Any copyright holder who did 
not want her works included in Google’s index could simply opt 
out of the project.7 The search company pledged to honor such 
requests, and even created a webpage to facilitate the opt-out 
process.8
Against Google’s hopes, the opt-out plan failed to 
extinguish the ire of many anxious authors.  In September of 2005, 
the Author’s Guild said that the opt-out plan “turned longstanding 
precedents in copyright law upside down, requiring owners to 
preemptively protect rights rather than requiring a user to gain 
approval for use of a copyrighted work.”9 Patricia Schroeder, 
president and CEO of the American Association of Publishers 
(APP), another group that filed suit against Google in October of 
2005, claimed that the opt-out plan “shifts the responsibility for 
preventing infringement to the copyright owner rather than the 
user, turning every principle of copyright law on its ear.”10 
law which permits the unlicensed reproduction of copyrighted works under 
certain circumstances.  The Copyright Act lists the following four balancing 
factors for use in determining the presence of fair use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).   
7 Information for Publishers About the Google Library Project, (Google, Inc.), 
at http://print.google.com/googleprint/publisher_library.html (“If you are a 
current Google Print publisher, you can simply upload a list of the books you 
don’t want in Google Print . . . . If you’re not a Google Print partner and want us 
to avoid your books, you’ll need to provide us with a small amount of 
information about yourself as well as a list of the books you don’t want in the 
Google Library . . . . We’re happy to remove your book from our search results 
at any time, just as we do for publishers of websites.  You’ll need to . . . let[] us 
know which books to exclude.”). 
8 Google Print Library Project Exclusion Registration, (Google, Inc.), at 
https://print.google.com/publisher/exclusion-signup. 
9 Edward Wyatt, Writers Sue Google, Accusing It of Copyright Violation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005.  
10 Press Release, Association of American Publishers, Google Library Project 
Raises Serious Questions for Publishers and Authors (August 12, 2005) at 
http://www.publishers.org/press/releases.cfm?PressReleaseArticleID=274. 
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Traditionally, opt-out schemes like Google’s wouldn’t be 
influential in determining whether copying is protected by the 
doctrine of Fair Use.11 In part, this is because the issue is 
somewhat new within the narrow context of copyright 
infringement.  Only recently have projects such as Google’s sought 
to systematically record such massive amounts of data owned by 
such a multitude of parties, that an opt-out plan would be useful.  
But as we consider the benefits that might come from Google’s 
digital Library of Alexandria,12 the questions are clear:  To what 
degree should opt-out provisions influence copyright law?  When –
if ever– should copyright infer consent from notice followed by 
inaction?  What are the social, legal, and economic strengths and 
weaknesses of opt-out programs?  These questions are at the heart 
of a fascinating new realm of copyright law that will ultimately 
determine how our society indexes and accesses creative works. 
 The concept of opting-out has already been of great 
importance, both in substantive and procedural law.  In contract 
law, the issue arises when an offeror imposes a burden on offerees 
to actively reject offers they don’t wish to be bound to.  American 
courts encountered this issue as early as 1893, when Justice 
Holmes rendered his decision in Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co.,
which concerned whether a recipient of eel-skins had, through his 
silent failure to reject the goods, tacitly accepted to pay the seller.  
Holmes’ finding of acceptance through silence is currently 
reflected in the Restatement of Contracts, which explicitly allows 
for acceptance through failure to opt out of an offer.13 Known 
 
11 The doctrine of fair use, for example, does not account for such procedures.  
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). 
12 “The Royal Library of Alexandria was once the largest in the world.  It is 
usually assumed to have been founded at the beginning of the 3rd century BC . . 
. .”  Said to have been seeded with Aristotle’s own private collection of books, it 
is rumored that all visitors to Egypt were once “required to surrender all books 
and scrolls in their possession; these writings were then swiftly copied by 
official scribes.  The originals were put into the Library, and the copies were 
delivered to the previous owners.”  Wikipedia contributors, “Library of 
Alexandria,” Wikipiedia: The Free Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Alexandria 
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 69 (1981) (“Acceptance by 
silence or exercise of dominion:  Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his 
silence and inaction operate as an acceptance . . . Where an offeree takes the 
benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason 
to know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation.”). 
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today as “negative option marketing,” the contractual opt-out is 
widely used by mail-order businesses that send consumers goods 
in the mail along with a demand to either return the goods or pay 
for them.14 
The same issue has recently arisen in privacy law.  For 
years, Americans have chosen to opt out of telephone solicitations 
by paying to have their phone numbers unlisted.15 Aware of 
widespread distaste for telephone sales calls, the FTC created the 
National Do-Not-Call Registry, which has received over 100 
million registrations to date.16 The opt-out approach is also 
commonly used for solicitations sent via traditional mail.  In fact, 
the Direct Mailing Association (DMA), a trade association of 
companies that use direct-mail advertising, has received over 3.3 
million consumer requests not to receive solicitations in the mail.17 
These recent developments dealing with “informational privacy”18 
have important bearing on the Google opt-out issue.  This paper 
will explore why many consider opt-out systems to be superior to 
opt-in systems with respect to the indexing and use of consumer 
data.19 
The Author’s Guild’s lawsuit against Google ironically 
presents yet another domain where opting-out is a preferred mode 
 
14 See, e.g, Terms and Conditions of Membership to BMG Music Service, (BMG 
Direct) at http://www.bmgmusic.com/global/how_membership_works.jhtml  
(“If you want it, do nothing; it will be shipped to you automatically. If you don’t 
want it, respond online or through the mail by the date specified. If you receive 
an unwanted Featured Selection, return it within 10 days at our expense and we 
will credit your account.”). 
15 See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, Or No Options At All: The Fight 
For Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1065 (“The 
percentage of consumers willing to pay for unpublished numbers varies from 
state to state. In California, fifty-five percent of residential telephone numbers 
are unlisted, while in New York, only twenty-four percent of residents have 
unpublished.”). 
16 Statement of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras on 
the 100 Millionth Number on the National Do Not Call Registry, (The Federal 
Trade Commission), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/dncstatment.htm;  DNC 
Registrations as of Aug 16 2005 at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/050816dnc 
registrations.pdf 
17 Sovern, supra note 15 at 1068. 
18 Id. at 1042 (quoting Jacob Sullum, Secrets for Sale, REASONS, Apr. 1992, at 
29, available at http://reason.com/9204/fe.sullum.shtml). 
19 See generally Michael E. Staten, The Impact of Opt-in Privacy Rules on Retail 
Credit Markets: A Case Study of MBNA, 52 Duke L.J. 745 (2002). 
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of operation: class action lawsuits.  It is almost comic to recognize 
that the very parties who call Google’s opt-out scheme an unfair 
burden on authors have instituted a class action requiring authors 
who do not wish to sue Google to opt out.  Like many class 
actions, the suit is governed by Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure20, which requires that all members of a class be 
sent notice explaining the nature of the claims and their freedom to 
opt out of the suit.21 In contrast to the earlier federal rule requiring 
parties to opt in to class action suits, many believe that the current 
opt-out scheme has made class action lawsuits more powerful 
instruments of change.22 The legal and sociological reasons 
supporting this rule shed light on how copyright law might handle 
the matter. 
 Finally, the opt-out question has been addressed in 
copyright law itself, under circumstances almost identical to the 
Google Book Search controversy.  Currently, search engines, 
which operate by copying and indexing information online, utilize 
an opt-out scheme known as, “webcrawler exclusion.”23 Copyright 
holders who don’t want their material indexed by search engines 
can place a special text file on their web server titled, “robots.txt,” 
which stands as a gatekeeper, instructing automated search 
programs not to index some or all of a website’s contents.24 
Today, this is the most common method of preventing unwanted 
copying by search engines.25 
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (1998) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the court must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the 
circumstances . . . . The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily 
under stood language . . . . that the court will exclude from the class any member 
who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be 
excluded.”). 
21 See Class Action Complaint, The Author’s Guild v. Google (Sept. 20, 2005), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/aggoog92005cmp.pdf 
(showing the applicability of Rule 23(b)(3) to the action). 
22 See generally Steven T.O. Cottreau, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of 
Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 480 (1998). 
23 See generally MARTIJN KOSTNER, A STANDARD FOR ROBOT EXCLUSION 
(1994), at http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html. 
24 Id.
25 The robots.txt standard is widely known by website administrators.  While it 
appears no formal empirical study has been performed on the matter, the 
popularity of robots.txt is recognized by major organizations, such as The 
Internet Archive, a prominent non-profit group. See, e.g., Removing Documents 
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Common threads connect all of the examples above:  In 
each case, a centralized entity acts upon a large class of 
individuals;  Rights are sacrificed, but only slightly so.  Costs are 
balanced against conveniences, and burdens are placed on those 
who seem to best bear the load.  This article will explore these 
themes, and define the factors that make opt-outs desirable.  
Focusing on social, legal, and economic considerations, Part I of 
this article will explore the issue with respect to contract and 
privacy law.  In Part II, the success of opt-out class action rules 
will be analyzed.  Part III will study the opt-out rule with respect to 
copyright, and Part IV will apply the lessons learned in previous 
sections to the Google Book Search issue.  Ultimately, it will be 
argued that opt-out provisions should be considered as a new factor 
in fair use analysis. 
 
I. PRIVACY AND CONTRACTUAL OPT-OUTS 
A. Contracts: Negative Option Agreements 
 Opt-outs are built on the idea that sometimes, silence 
conveys acceptance.  In the business world, this assumption has 
proven to be ripe for exploitation by opportunists.  Nevertheless, 
American contract law continues to recognize silence as a 
legitimate mode of assent. 
 An early example of silence as acceptance dates from 1893, 
when Justice Holmes (then on the bench of the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts) rendered his decision in Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip 
Company.26 In this seminal case, the plaintiff, a purveyor of eel 
skins, made a shipment to the defendant, who never explicitly 
placed an order.  The defendant had previously paid the plaintiff 
for unsolicited goods, but this time, the defendant kept the goods 
but refused to pay.27 Finding the defendant liable, Justice Holmes 
stated that “conduct which imports acceptance or assent is 
 
From the Wayback Machine, at http://www.archive.org/about/exclude.php 
(“Robots.txt is the most widely used method for controlling the behavior of 
automated robots on your site . . . all major robots, including those of Google, 
Alta Vista, etc. respect these exclusions.”). 
26 33 N.E. 495 (1893). 
27 Id. 
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acceptance or assent in the view of the law, whatever may have 
been the actual state of mind of the party.”28 
Today, Section 69 of The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, states this principle as follows: 
 
§ 69. Acceptance by Silence or Exercise of Dominion 
(1) Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his 
silence and inaction operate as an acceptance in 
the following cases only: 
(a) where an offeree takes the benefit of 
offered services with reasonable 
opportunity to reject them and reason 
to know that they were offered with 
the expectation of compensation. 
(b) Where the offeror has stated or given 
the offeree reason to  understand that 
assent may be manifested by silence 
or inaction, and the offeree in 
remaining silent and inactive intends 
to accept the offer. 
(c) Where because of previous dealings 
or otherwise, it is    reasonable that 
the offeree should notify the offeror 
if he does not intend to accept.29 
Silence as acceptance is also recognized in the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), which governs commercial transactions 
between businesses in almost every state.30 
28 Id.
29 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 69. 
30 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), regulates commercial transactions in 
every state except Louisiana.  UCC § 2-606(1)(b) provides that “acceptance of 
goods occurs when the buyer . . . fails to make an effective rejection” after 
having had a reasonable opportunity to inspect.  A similar policy is expressed in 
§ 2-327(1)(b), which states, “failure seasonably to notify the seller of election to 
return the goods is acceptance. . . .”  This is a reasonable policy, because 
merchants have usually negotiated before the time of shipment, and “most 
relevant contract have been ironed out.”  Avery Katz, “Transaction Costs and 
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By requiring action on the part of offerees, common law 
essentially imposes an opt-out.  A well-known example of 
contractual opt-outs is the “negative option agreement.”  This 
business device was introduced in 1926, when Maxwell Sackheim 
and Harry Scherman began the famous Book-of-the-Month Club.31 
The business plan was simple:  First, consenting subscribers 
received advance notice of the monthly book.  If they didn’t want 
to buy it, they opted out by mail or telephone – otherwise, the book 
arrived at the subscriber’s door, along with a bill.32 Buyers were 
spared the time and trouble of searching for good books. For 
Sackheim and Scherman, the plan was a fantastically effective 
sales device, and launched The Book-of-the-Month Club to 
success.33 
Today, negative option marketing is most popular with 
book, CD, and movie-of-the-month clubs, such as Columbia House 
and BMG, as well as cable, telephone and insurance companies.34 
By placing an affirmative duty on offerees to avoid accepting 
contracts however, negative option agreements create a high 
potential for fraud.35 Since the time of Sackheim and Scherman, 
 
the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer 
Be Construed as Acceptance?” 9 J. L. Econ. & Org. 77, 94 (noting that in such 
common cases, “requiring an affirmative acceptance . . . would add an 
unnecessary transaction cost”). 
31 See Peter Bowal, “Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option 
Marketing” 36 Am. Bus. L.J. 377, 378.  The Book-of-the-Month club wasn’t 
truly a club, but a business.  The Franklin Library, established by Benjamin 
Franklin in 1731, is often cited as the nation’s first true book club.  In exchange 
for ten shillings per year,  subscribers enjoyed the grand literary treasures that 
their pooled resources could buy. See “A Brief History of the Library Company 
of Philadelphia” at http://www.librarycompany.org/instance.htm.  Over time 
however, and with some notable exceptions such as Oprah Winfrey’s book club, 
the term, “book club” has come to refer to businesses that send consumers books 
by mail. 
32 See Bowal, supra note 31 at 378. 
33 Id. Maxwell Sackheim went on to become a highly regarded figure in the 
world of advertising.  See generally MAXWELL SACKHEIM, MY FIRST SIXTY 
YEARS IN ADVERTISING (Prentice Hall 1970). 
34 See, e.g., Terms and Conditions of Membership to BMG Music Service, supra 
note 14. 
35 See, e.g., Children’s Book Publisher to Pay $710,000 to Settle Charges it 
Violated Commission’s Negative Option and Telemarketing Sales Rule, at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/scholastic.htm (June 21, 2005) (describing 
Scholastic Inc.’s agreement to settle after being charged with operating a 
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many unscrupulous businesses have abused negative option 
agreements by providing consumers with inadequate and 
misleading information, or making it difficult and costly to opt 
out.36 Victims of these scams have been bound to terms they never 
accepted, and goods they never wished for. 
 American law has sought to curb these threats.  Under the 
common law of the Restatement, and federal regulations, a buyer 
and seller must be involved in an ongoing relationship (such as a 
book-of-the-month club).37 Federal regulations also require the 
seller to properly inform the buyer of payment obligations and how 
to easily opt out.  The FTC’s Prenotification Negative Option 
Rule38, which applies to negative option agreements offered by 
telemarketers, requires disclosure of: 
 
all material terms and conditions of the negative 
option feature, including, but not limited to, the fact 
that the customer’s account will be charged unless 
the customer takes an affirmative action to avoid the 
charge(s), the date(s) the charge(s) will be 
submitted for payment and the specific steps the 
customer must take to avoid charge(s).39 
While this rule pertains only to the telemarketing industry, it 
reflects the general consumer protection principle that “[s]ellers 
must give consumers information about . . . terms and policies, 
clearly and conspicuously, in their promotional materials.”40 
Despite such regulation, some consumer protection 
advocates still object to negative option contracts and contend that 
 
deceptive negative option book plan, in violation of an FTC rule). 
36 See generally Bowal, supra note 31. 
37 See the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. §3009[d]), which prohibits 
offers in the form of merchandise from sellers unknown to buyers.  The logic 
behind this policy can be traced back to the words of Justice Holmes in Hobbs v. 
Massasoit Whip, supra note 26.
38 16 C.F.R § 310.3, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/legal.htm (click on 
“FTC Rules” and navigate to view section 310.3 of 16 C.F.R.). 
39 Id. at § 310.3 a(1)(vii). 
40 “Prenotification Negative Option Plans” at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pu 
bs/products/negative.htm. See also, Linda A. Goldstein, “Shining a Light on the 
TSR’s New Negative Option Regulations,” Response Magazine, April 2003 at 
54. 
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the high potential for consumer fraud warrants a complete ban.41 
Why hasn’t their view prevailed?  The answer, discussed below, 
lies in the economic efficiency and fairness of opt-outs. 
 
B. Contracts: Analysis of Negative Option Agreements 
 Unlike other opt-out examples in this article, negative 
option contracts directly concern the sale of goods.  This presents 
an opportunity to rigorously explore the economics of opt-outs.  
The following model42 will later be useful in exploring opt-outs in 
the world of copyright. 
 Consider a small mail-order book service.  Suppose the 
most a buyer is willing to pay for a given book (v), is twenty 
dollars.  The seller, through her experience in sales, is aware of this 
value, and looks for a suitable price to charge (p).  In a strict opt-in 
system, “book-of-the-month” clubs as we know them wouldn’t 
exist;  Offer and acceptance would be required for each sale,  
compelling the seller to spend money to entice consumers.  This 
search cost (s) would involve advertising every monthly book to 
the public.  Distributed, assume this cost amounts to ten dollars 
per-book.  Interested buyers will incur a small communication 
cost, say, two dollars (r) to tell the seller they wish to buy.  As a 
result, buyers will only purchase if the book is equal to or less than 
eighteen dollars ( p @ v – r ).  Similarly, the seller can only profit 
by charging more than ten dollars – their advertising expense ( s <
p).  In an opt-in system, a sale will only occur if the book costs 
between ten and eighteen dollars. 
 The picture is quite different under an opt-out regime.  
Here, we can imagine a typical book-of-the-month scenario.  
Unlike the opt-in arrangement, buyers need not be stirred into 
action by advertisements - they will “buy” books through total 
inaction.  As a result, instead of spending ten dollars (s) to find 
willing buyers, the seller need only spend a small amount, say, one 
dollar (w), to inform customers of the monthly title, and how to 
opt-out.  (This could be accomplished with an email).  Buyers will 
 
41 See generally Bowal, supra note 31 at 390. 
42 This model is adapted from one presented by Avery Katz of the University of 
Michigan in his 1993 article, “Transaction Costs and the legal mechanics of 
Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as 
Acceptance?”.  Katz supra note 30,  at 80-81. 
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either keep the book and pay for it, or send a refusal (r, set at two 
dollars above).  In this scenario, buyers will purchase whenever the 
book is equal to or less than twenty-two dollars ( p @ v + r ).  The 
seller will profit by charging anything more than one dollar – the 
cost of informing customers ( w < p ).  Thus, sales will occur if the 
book costs between one and twenty-two dollars.  This margin is 
clearly wider than the one created by the opt-in system, and will 
lead to more transactions. The following table illustrates both 
models:43 
Opt-out regime Opt-in regime 
Buyer does nothing Buyer gains:  v - p
Seller earns:  p – w
Buyer gains:  0 
Seller earns:  - s
Buyer accepts Buyer gains:  v – r - p
Seller earns:   p – s
Buyer rejects Buyer gains:  -r 
Seller earns:  -w 
Sale occurs when w @ p @ v + r
(1 @ p @ 20 + 2) 
s @ p @ v – r
(10 @ p @ 20 - 2) 
p = price of book (variable) 
v = maximum amount buyer is willing to pay ($20) 
s = cost of advertising book to buyer ($10) 
r = cost for buyer to communicate interest to seller (price to opt-in) ($2) 
w = cost for seller to inform buyer how to opt-out (price to opt-out) ($1) 
Table 1: Cost comparison of negative option agreements 
 
The conclusion that opt-outs result in more transactions is 
supported by empirical evidence.  In a recent survey conduced by 
the FCC, seventy-two telephone operating companies selling wire 
maintenance plans reported an average acceptance rate of eighty 
percent under negative option selling plans, as compared with 
forty-five percent under normal selling conditions.44 Similarly, 
 
43 For clarity, this model does not account for the advertising costs associated 
with enticing consumers to sign-up for opt-out services such as the book-of-the-
month club presented here.  This model assumes an existing subscriber base. 
44 Mark T. Spriggs and John R. Nevin, “Negative Option Selling Plans: Current 
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cable television companies have reported thirty-five to forty 
percent increases in channel subscriptions under negative option 
agreements.45 Profits from these higher sales “can be retained as 
higher margins or passed through to buyers in the form of lower 
prices, which may increase sales volume even further if more 
price-sensitive buyers choose to purchase at the new lower 
price.”46 
Of course, harm occurs when the price of opting-out is 
high.  In these cases, consumers are bound to pay high prices for 
goods they don’t want.  Federal regulations and state common law 
attempt to forbid such abuses while permitting negative option 
agreements to flourish where they are most valuable - when 
communication costs are low, and business search costs are high.47 
C. Privacy: The National Do-Not-Call Registry 
 In 1781, James Otis famously said, “[O]ne of the most 
essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one’s house.  
A man’s house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as well 
guarded as a prince in his castle.”48 The notion of one’s home as a 
stronghold of privacy was later enshrined in the Fourth 
Amendment,49 and has long been a pillar of the American identity.  
In the 1980s, however, a new technology threatened domestic 
privacy:  Telemarketing.  Armed with phone directories, troops of 
aggressive marketers interrupted the privacy of countless 
American homes.  The practice was often invasive, annoying, and 
sometimes capable of harm.50 
Forms Versus Existing Regulations” 15 J. of Pub. Pol. & Marketing 227, 229 
(quoting a 1998 FCC survey). 
45 Sovern, supra note 15, at 1092. 
46 Spriggs, supra note 44. 
47 See, e.g., The FTC’s Prenotification Negative Option Rule, supra note 38; The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 69, supra note 29. 
48 “In Opposition to Writs of Assistance by James Otis,” available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/268/8/9.html. 
49 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. 
50 See, e.g. Sovern, supra note 15 at 1069 (describing the pain of continuing to 
receive solicitations for women’s apparel after the death of his wife);  See also 
Id, at note 191 (““sadness, shattered feeling, family rifts, grief, doubt, and 
devastation” cause by direct-mail ads which included handwritten notes from 
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The problem came to a head in the early 1990s, leading 
Congress to enact regulations which sought to lessen the number of 
unwanted sales calls.51 The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 
and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention 
Act directed the FTC and FCC to create new rules and measures 
that regulated telemarketing more closely.52 An early approach 
forbade businesses from calling people who had previously told 
those particular businesses not to call.53 As telemarketing grew 
more widespread however, most consumers agreed that this 
“company specific” approach just didn’t go far enough.54 In 
response, Congress promoted the National Do-Not-Call Registry, 
which allows people to opt out of receiving most types of 
telephone solicitations.55 
The proposed do-not-call registry received overwhelming 
support from consumer groups, but some privacy advocates urged 
for an even more restrictive opt-in approach, which would prohibit 
“telemarketing to any consumer who ha[d] not expressly agreed to 
receive telephone solicitations.”56 A fitting name might have been 
“The Please-Do-Call Registry.”  Pointing to strong consumer 
support for opt-in systems in other contexts, advocates urged that 
the approach would “more effectively protect individuals’ rights 
and ensure that only those who wish to be called receive 
solicitations.”57 
direct mailer suggesting recipient try anti-aging creams, diet pills and the like; 
notes confused recipient into thinking someone they knew had sent them direct 
mailer’s ads””) (quoting Larson – citation required). 
51 47 U.S.C. s. 227, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) (1991); 
The Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (TCPA) 
(1994). 
52 See generally Id.
53 See § 310.4(b)(1)(ii) of the TCPA (forbidding any telemarketer from calling a 
person when that person previously stated that he or she does not wish to receive 
calls).  See also 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(a)-(f). 
54 See 16 C.F.R. pt. 310, Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 19 at 4630 (January 29, 
2003) (“most find even the initial call from a telemarketer or seller to be abusive 
and invasive of privacy.”). 
55 See generally The Federal Do-Not-Call Registry at http://www.donotcall.gov. 
56 See 16 C.F.R. pt. 310, Federal Register, supra note 54 at 4630 (“Consumer 
groups supported the creation of a national “do-no-call” registry, and some 
privacy advocates urged the Commission to take an even more restrictive “opt-
in” approach by banning telemarketing to any consumer who has not expressly 
agreed to receive telephone solicitations.”). 
57 Do-Not-Call Comment by Electronic Privacy Information Center, 3 at 
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Rule-makers were not convinced.  While an opt-in might 
protect more consumers against unwanted calls, the FCC felt that 
“establishing such an approach would be overly restrictive on the 
telemarketing industry.”58 In public forums held by the FTC, the 
point was raised several times that an opt-in system would 
“dramatically increase[] costs for businesses” by requiring them to 
communicate to millions of potential customers in order to find 
those who would want to receive calls.59 In contrast, consumers 
could register for free on the opt-out do-not-call registry, and 
businesses would be given access at a low cost.  Further, it was 
recognized that an opt-in system would deprive many consumers 
of the opportunity to learn about products of possible interest to 
them.60 
Fortunately, it seems the rule-makers were right.  With over 
100 million registrations to date and high consumer satisfaction, 
the National Do-Not-Call registry stands as an “enormously 
popular” success.61 The analysis below explores the particular 
features of telemarketing that lend it so well to opting out. 
 
D. Privacy: Analysis of Telemarketing Opt-Outs 
 Consider a business that wishes to use telemarketing.  
Under an opt-in “please-do-call” approach, the business would 
need to spend a large amount of money to search for customers 
who wish to be contacted.  These expenses might include 
 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/epicetal.pdf (“EPIC”).  
See also Do-Not-Call Comment by National Consumers League at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/ncl.pdf 
58 In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 (CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153), 
(July 3, 2003) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/F 
CC-03-153A1.pdf 
59 Federal Trade Commission Rulemaking Workshop, Session 1: Wednesday, 
June 5, 2002, 65 at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/020605xscript.pdf 
60 See Id. (“The original question you asked was about why not have specific 
opt-in for calls, and I guess the simple answer to that is that the Commission in 
that approach is trying to do too much and that in doing too much it is 
dramatically increasing costs for businesses and reducing services for 
consumers.”). 
61 Annual Report to Congress for FY 2003 and 2004: Implementation of the 
National Do Not Call Registry, FTC, 3, at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/donotcall/ 
051004dncfy0304.pdf 
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television advertisements, magazine inserts, or soliciting of past 
customers.62 Alternatively, in the current opt-out regime, 
interested consumers don’t need to be motivated to opt in – they 
receive calls by default.  Here, businesses are spared high search 
costs, and need only spend a small fee to access the National Do-
Not-Call Registry.63 
One might mistakenly conclude that when a high 
percentage of individuals wishes to opt out, an opt-in telemarketing 
rule is more desirable.  The argument goes as follows: If only five 
percent of consumers wish to be called at home, why not place the 
burden of choice on the few rather than the many?  This reasoning, 
however, ignores the fact that opt-ins require businesses to spend 
large sums of money in advertising.64 In fact, it would be most 
expensive to locate the smallest groups of interested consumers.  
By spending more money searching for potential customers, 
businesses are left with less money to serve existing customers.  
This could lead to lower quality goods and services, higher prices, 
or, if search costs are high enough, an abandonment of 
telemarketing altogether.  In contrast, the cost savings provided by 
an opt-out could lead to continued telemarketing and possibly 
lower prices, greater shareholder returns, and higher-quality goods 
and services. 
 The advantages of telemarketing opt-outs are even more 
dramatic when viewed from a social perspective.  Assume three 
classes of affected individuals:  (1) Those who know they want to 
be called by telemarketers, (2) those who know they do not want to 
be called, and (3) those who are apathetic.  Under an opt-in or opt-
out regime where “opting” is free, the burden on groups (1) and (2) 
is arguably too negligible to form the basis of a compelling 
argument for either mode of operation.65 The truly important 
 
62 At this point, it might be better for the company to simply advertise their 
products rather than advertise why consumers should opt-in to a telemarketing 
sales service. 
63 See Q&A for Telemarketers and Sellers About the Do Not Call Provisions of 
the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/dncbizalrt.htm#paying (“Data for up 
to five area codes is free. The annual fee is $56 per area code of data (after five), 
with a maximum annual fee of $15,400 for the entire U.S. database.”). 
64 See generally Jared Strauss, The Do-Not-Call List’s Big Hang-Up, 10 Rich. J. 
L. & Tech. 27 (2004), at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i4/article27.pdf 
65 Opting out is essentially free, while complaining about opting out can become 
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individuals comprise group (3).  Under the National Do-Not-Call 
Registry’s current opt-out scheme, these parties still receive sales 
calls.  Presumably, some eventually grow annoyed enough to opt 
out.  However, some in this group eventually benefit – 
telemarketing may inform them of a service or product interests 
them.  The opt-out system provides these individuals with a benefit 
where the opt-in system does not.  While opting in shifts the 
miniscule “burden” of choice away from those adverse to 
telemarketing, it does at a great cost to businesses and consumers. 
 In sum, the National Do-Not-Call Registry illustrates that 
when the cost of “opting” is low and business search costs are 
high, opt-outs are the most economically efficient and socially 
desirable mode of choice.  
 
E. Conclusion: Economic Benefits 
 This section does not advocate the virtues of telemarketing 
or book-of-the-month clubs.  Rather, the goal here has been to 
demonstrate two examples from the business world where the opt-
out succeeds.  Like Google Book Search, both telemarketing and 
negative option agreements implicate the legal rights of a large 
number of individuals, while benefiting many in the process.  A 
lack of regulation would permit these businesses to violate 
personal rights, while opt-in enrollment would freeze valuable 
economic activity.  Opt-out is a fair and functional compromise 
because it saves businesses high transaction costs while respecting 
the rights of those who want no involvement. 
 
II. CLASS ACTION OPT-OUTS 
The Author’s Guild and the American Association of 
Publishers claim that Google’s opt-out plan shifts an unfair burden 
onto authors.  In seeking to eliminate this burden, the Author’s 
Guild has remarkably and paradoxically replicated it in the form of 
an opt-out class action lawsuit.66 Pondering the oddness of this 
 
expensive.  Under either regime, individuals in these groups will easily have 
their way. 
66 See Class Action Complaint, The Author’s Guild v. Google, supra note 21 
(discussing the applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) to the 
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situation, one is reminded of M.C. Escher’s impossible staircases, 
on which one travels upward forever until their wits grow frail.  
The true reason for this contradiction however, lies in the power 
and equity of opt-out enrollment in the class action arena. 
 
A. The History of Class Action Opt-Outs 
 At the birth of class suits during the sixteenth and 
seventeen centuries,67 parties did not fluidly join or leave classes 
by personal choice.  This was because legal ‘classes’ were usually 
preexisting communities, such as villagers, parishioners, or 
manorial tenants.68 Individual grievances (or liabilities) were 
derivative in nature69 and decrees applied to the community as a 
whole.  Naturally then, judgments in some cases were binding even 
on community members who didn’t participate.70 In Brown v. 
Vermuden71 for example, a vicar sued for the right to tithe from all 
miners in his parish.  The miners appointed four representatives to 
defend the suit and ultimately lost.  Some years later, a miner 
disputed his duty to pay the tax, based on the fact that he had not 
been a party to the earlier action.  The Chancellor held the minor 
by the earlier decree, explaining that to do otherwise would result 
 
action). 
67 See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, “An Historical Analysis of the Binding 
Effect of Class Suits,” 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1862-1885 (describing the 
evolution of class suits, beginning in the early seventeenth century).  This 
detailed and fascinating article provides the backbone for much of the historical 
discussion in this section. 
68 See Stephen C. Yeazell, “Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a 
History of the Class Action,”  77 Colum. L. Rev. 866, 872 (“[E]very  sixteenth 
and seventeenth-century case of group litigation I have found involves the 
members of rural agricultural communities – manorial tenants, villagers, and 
parishioners.”). 
69 Id. at 871 (“Seventeenth-century group litigation is not about the legal rights 
of aggregated individuals but about the incidents of status flowing from 
membership in an agricultural community not yet part of a market economy.”) 
70 Hazard, supra note 67 at 1865 (“While it is risky to interject modern analysis 
into pre-modern situations, it does appear that Chancery in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries felt reasonably confident about the fairness of 
adjudicating rights of absentees where the absentees belonged to a preexisting 
group and some members of the group were before the court as litigants.”). 
71 1 Ch. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676).  Brown v. Vermuden is widely-
cited in works explaining the evolution of class suits. 
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in suits “infinite and impossible to be ended.”72 This early account 
shows how claim preclusion (res judicata) resulted from the 
treatment of a preexisting group as a sort of “set or entity for 
procedural purposes.” 73 
Despite such early cases, equity courts became uncertain of 
the fairness in allowing a suit to proceed with absent class 
members (a question of joinder of necessary parties),74 and 
whether absentees should be bound after a judgment (a question of 
res judicata).75 During the nineteenth century, these concerns 
were soothed to some extent by the legal fiction that absentees 
impliedly authorized representatives when those representatives 
belonged their community.76 
Questions of personal choice in class membership during 
this period first appeared in suits involving unassociated parties, 
such as creditors or legatees.77 As these were not preexisting 
groups, it seemed a strain to find implied authorization to 
representation on the part of absentees.  As a result, decrees in such 
cases were often “binding only on those absentees who had, prior 
to the litigation, some connection with the representative 
concerning the matter in litigation”78 - In effect, those who opted to 
associate themselves with the representative. 
 While a complete study would require volumes, it can 
succinctly be said that the ability of absentees to define their 
membership both prior to, and following judgment remained 
muddy and unsettled through much of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.79 In 1838, Justice Joseph Story attempted to 
crystallize the confusion by defining three types of classes: “where 
the question is one of ‘common or general’ interest, where a 
 
72 Id.
73 Hazard, supra note 67 at 1865. 
74 Id. at 1866 (“Toward the latter part of the eighteenth century, Chancery began 
to apply the Necessary Parties Rule with greater inflexibility.”). 
75 See generally Hazard et. al., Civil Procedure (5th ed. Foundation Press 2001) 
at 646 (explaining res judicata). 
76 See Hazard, supra note 67 at 1877 (explaining that suits were allowed to go 
forward with absent parties, if “the representatives appearing as parties were 
expressly or impliedly authorized by the absentees to sue or defend in their 
behalf”). 
77 See generally Id. at 1866-1878 (discussing creditor and legatee bills). 
78 Id. at 1878. 
79 Id. at 1877 (“The preclusive effect of a representative suit in English 
Chancery practice thus stood unsettled in the early nineteenth century.”). 
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voluntary association is involved, and where the parties are so 
numerous that, without regard to any other criterion, it is 
impracticable to join them.”80 Unfortunately, Story’s definitions 
often overlapped and muddled questions of res judicata further.81 
Built upon Justice Story’s work, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure of 1938 inherited many of the same uncertainties.  Rule 
23 of originally permitted classes: 
 
[w]hen the character of the right sought to be 
enforced for or against the class is 
 
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that 
the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that 
right and a member of the class thereby becomes 
entitled to it; 
 
(2) several, and the object of the action is the 
adjudication of claims which do or may affect 
specific property involved in the action; or 
 
(3) several, and there is a common question of law 
or fact affecting the several rights and a common 
relief is sought.82 
Under this formulation, absentees in type (1) or (2) suits could not 
define their membership, while absentees in type (3) suits had the 
right to opt in, before or after a judgment had been rendered.83 
80 Id. at 1879 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS 
§97, at 97-98 (2d ed. 1840)). 
81 Id. at 1878-1882 (noting that “Story’s treatment of the binding effect of a class 
suit decree is tentative and indeed puzzling.  His analytical system consists of 
categories that overlap. . . .”). 
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938) (repealed 1966). 
83 See, e.g., American Pipe and Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1973) 
(“A recurrent source of abuse under the former Rule law in the potential that 
members of the claimed class could in some situations await developments in 
the trial or even final judgment on the merits in order to determine whether 
participation would be favorable to their interests.  If the evidence at the trial 
made their prospective position as actual class members appear weak, or if a 
judgment precluded the possibility of a favorable determination, such putative 
members of the class who chose not to intervene or join as parties would not be 
bound by the judgment.  This situation – the position for so-called ‘one-way 
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Opting in after a judgment, a practice which became known 
as “one-way intervention,” amounted to placing bets on a horse 
race after it had run.  A leading example of this behavior is Union 
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,84 decided in 1961.  In that case, 
thirty-six named miners sued for themselves and 350 unnamed 
miners, seeking damages for antitrust monopoly violations.  Only 
after the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs were the absentee 
miners identified and asked to come forward with claims for 
specific damages.  Presumably, a negative judgment would not 
have been binding on these unnamed parties. 
 In an attempt to correct the unfairness of one-way 
intervention, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee transformed 
Rule 23(b)(3) in 1966 from an opt-in to an opt-out.  The revised 
rule states: 
 
“In any class action maintained under subsection 
(b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the 
class the best notice practicable under the 
circumstances, including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) 
the court will exclude him from the class if he so 
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, 
whether favorable or not, will include all members 
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member 
who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, 
enter an appearance through his counsel.”85 
The Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying this revision 
explains that the opt-out approach served a dual purpose:  It 
provided a means to prevent one-way intervention,86 while also 
lessening the likelihood of res judicata questions after the 
judgment.87 Distinguished Judge, Marvin Frankel, famously 
 
intervention’ – aroused considerable criticism upon the ground that it was unfair 
to allow members of a class to benefit from a favorable judgment without 
subjecting themselves to the binding effect of an unfavorable one.”). 
84 300 F.2d 561 (CA,1961). 
85 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c )(2). 
86 See John. E. Kennedy, “Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out,” 25 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 3, 17 n82 (explaining the one-way intervention basis for the rule). 
87 See 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-106 (1966) (discussing the issue of res judicata 
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summed-up Rule 23’s opt-out by saying it appeared to be 
“patterned after the highly successful procedures of the Book-of-
the-Month Club.”88 This change had an instant and dramatic 
impact on class formation, and is a “key premise for many of the 
basic principles that shape the b(3) action.”89 
B. Collective Action Benefits 
The opt-out approach in class action proceedings has 
benefits beyond curtailing one-way intervention.  Statistics indicate 
that most people, either through apathy or lack of information, do 
not reply to notice letters.  A 2004 survey of  class action suits 
between 1993 and 2003 reported that “on average, less than 1 [one] 
percent of class members opt-out and about [one] percent of class 
members object to class-wide settlements.”90 While it depends on 
the particular case, it is generally assumed that most who fail to opt 
out do so out of lack of motivation.91 (These ambivalent parties 
are analogous to the disinterested group discussed in the 
telemarketing section earlier in this article).  If a class suit only 
involved those opted-in, this ocean of ambivalent parties would be 
completely lost, possibly leaving the number of supporters “too 
 
disputes after judgment).  See also American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 
U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“The 1966 amendments were designed, in part, 
specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that 
members of the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be 
bound by all subsequent orders and judgments.”); Sarasota Oil Co. v. 
Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp., 483 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1973); Kaplan, 
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 391-92 n136 (1967) (“In the 
Preliminary Draft the right to opt out was not unqualified; the court could deny 
it to a class member whose inclusion was found essential to fair adjudication.”). 
88 Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 
39, 44 (1967).  Here, we might say an even better analogy would be found in the 
National Do-Not-Call Registry, which, like class actions, presents an opt-out 
obligation that doesn’t stem from prior consent.  See also Kenedy, supra note 86 
at 18 (noting that book-of-the-month clubs present opt-out burdens premised on 
prior consent). 
89 Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller, “The Role of Opt-Outs and 
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues,” 57 
Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1531. 
90 Id. at 1532. 
91 See Id. at 1561-1562 (attributing “overwhelming inaction displayed by class 
members” to “apathy”).  
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small to attract a lawyer for the group.”92 The Supreme Court 
articulated this point in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts,93 
stating: 
 
Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request 
inclusion would probably impede the prosecution of 
those class actions involving an aggregation of 
small individual claims, where a large number of 
claims are required to make it economical to bring 
suit.  The plaintiff’s claim may be so small, or the 
plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he would 
not file suit individually, nor would he affirmatively 
request inclusion in the class if such a request were 
required in the Constitution.94 
A simple example illustrates how the opt-in approach would 
hobble the class device:95 Imagine if a corporation negligently 
constructed a product that wronged one million people each out of 
one dollar.  In an opt-in regime, few would bother spending the 
time and effort to reply to notice.  Ultimately, the few who opted-
in would lack the necessary mass to make the corporation pay for 
the wrong it had committed.  The same scenario under an opt-out 
regime would produce an army of silent litigants nearly one 
million strong – large enough to correct the wrong and deter future 
harm. 
 
C. Supportive of 14th Amendment Procedural Due Process 
The Supreme Court has also recognized the power of opt-
out to establish personal jurisdiction over litigants in state court.  In 
Shutts, a party’s failure to respond to an opt-out justified a state 
court’s jurisdiction over him, even though he did not posses 
minimum contacts.  The underlying theory suggested by the Court 
 
92 John Bronsteen, “Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal,” 2005 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 903, 909. 
93 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
94 Id. at 812-813. 
95 See Bronsteen, supra note 92 at 909 (illustrating a similar example). 
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was that class members who do not reply to opt-outs implicitly 
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.96 
The right to opt out also supports the due process rights of 
absentees in class suits.  In Shutts, the Supreme Court explicitly 
refused to provide additional protections “to protect what must be 
the somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling to 
execute an ‘opt-out’ form, but whose claim is nonetheless so 
important that he cannot be presumed to consent to being a 
member of the class by his failure to do so.”97 Conversely, where 
opt-out rights are not provided, violations of due process have been 
found.98 
It is important to note that the right to opt out alone does 
not fulfill due process.  It is but one thread in a tapestry of 
guarantees that, together, give body to procedural due process in 
class suits.  Specifically, Rule 23(a) ensures congruence between 
the named representative parties and the absent parties by 
demanding that the “claims or defenses of the representative 
parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” and that 
the they adequately represent the class.99 Further, the detailed 
notice requirements of Rule 23 play an essential role in the opt-out 
process. 
 
D. Opting Out as a Check on Counsel 
Finally, some commentators posit that opt-outs act as a 
market check on the quality of counsel’s representation.100 Unlike 
strict opt-ins, opt-outs give counsel an incentive to provide good 
representation at the outset of a case, to avoid class attrition.101 A
court relying on this theory would be less burdened to scrutinize 
the adequacy of class counsel or representatives.102 
96 Shutts, supra note 93 at 812-14 (discussing the issue of due process and 
implicit submission to the tribunal). 
97 Id. at 813. 
98 See, e.g., Molski v. Gleich, 307 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002); West World 
Travel, Inc. v. AMR Corp., 218 F.R.D. 223, 241 (C.D. Cal 2003). 
99 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
100 See Eisenberg, supra note 89 at 1536. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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E. Conclusion: Social Benefits 
 From small agricultural community disputes to massive 
corporate litigations, the law has struggled to treat absentees fairly.  
The problem has been most thorny in cases where potential 
litigants have a choice of class enrollment.  The 1966 amendments 
to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure flipped the 
membership decision from an opt-in to an opt-out largely to curtail 
the unfair practice of one-way intervention.  But the benefits of 
opting out far surpassed this modest goal:  By marshaling the 
masses that don’t respond to class notification, the opt-out system 
enables justice to operate where it could not before.  Further, the 
opt-out system (combined with its accompanying notice 
requirements) works to ensure procedural due process.  Finally, 
opting-out acts as a market check on representative counsel. 
 But an even deeper lesson can be learned:  While earlier 
discussions of substantive law (privacy and contract) showed a 
benefit to businesses, the adoption of opt-outs in this area of 
procedural demonstrates a benefit to society.  The fact that opting 
out can serve both economic and social goals will be crucial in 
analyzing Google Book Search, which itself possesses this duality. 
 
III.  COPYRIGHT OPT-OUTS 
A. Registration, Deposit and Notice as Opt-Outs 
 American Copyright law has always placed affirmative 
duties on authors.  The requirements of registration and notice 
have changed since the original Copyright Act of 1790, but remain 
important to all authors who value and seek to protect their rights.  
It might be a surprise to hear these measures called “opt-outs,” but 
fundamentally, that’s just what they are:  Affirmative duties that 
authors must perform to repel infringement. 
 In the original Copyright Act of 1790, the requirements of 
formal registration and deposit were exhaustive and burdensome.  
Commenting on the matter, the former Register of Copyrights, 
Barbara Ringer, wrote that “[t]he most obvious and distinctive 
feature of the Act of 1790 is its extreme emphasis on compliance 
with formalities. . . . The 1790 Act displays an obsession with 
punctilios that goes beyond anything in any earlier copyright 
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legislation anywhere.”103 A quick look at the Act demonstrates 
this point:  Section 3 detailed the specific wording that had to be 
used upon recordation of deposit,104 and specified that within two 
months of publication, authors were to publish a copy of their 
registration record in a newspaper for a period of four weeks.105 
Failure to satisfy such requirements resulted in forfeiture of 
copyright.106 
The burden of registration and deposit only grew with time.  
In fact, the 1846 Act required a specific procedure by which 
authors had to deposit multiple copies of their work with both the 
Smithsonian and the Library of Congress.107 Subsequently, the 
1909 Act established submission of the correct number of deposit 
copies as a predicate both for obtaining registration (in section 11) 
and for the commencement of an infringement suit (in section 
13).108 
Notice requirements have also historically been 
burdensome.  Introduced in the revised Copyright Act of 1802, 
detailed statements of notice originally had to be about one 
hundred words in length.109 It was not until 1874 that a shorter 
form (consisting of the word, “Copyright,” the year of registration 
and the author’s name) was introduced.110 The 1976 Act 
introduced the recognizable symbol, © (the letter C inside a circle), 
 
103 JOYCE ET. AL. COPYRIGHT LAW, 417 (6th ed., LexisNexis) (hereinafter, 
Copyright). 
104 Copyright Act of 1790, § 3 (“And the clerk of such court is hereby directed 
and required to record the same forthwith, in a book to be kept by him for that 
purpose, in the words following . . . ‘District of --- to wit: Be it remembered, that 
on the --- day of --- in the --- year of the independence of the United States of 
America, A.B. of the said district, hath deposited in this office the title of a map, 
chart, book or books . . .the right whereof he claims as author or proprietor . . . 
in the words following to wit: [insert the title] in conformity to the act of the 
Congress of the United State entitled ‘An act for the encouragement of learning, 
by securing the copies of maps, chart, and book, to the authors and proprietors 
of such copies, during the time therein mentioned.’”). 
105 Id. (“And such author or proprietor shall, within two months from the date 
thereof cause a copy of the said record to be published in one or more of the 
newspapers printed in the United States, for the space of four weeks.”). 
106 Copyright, supra note 103 at 417. 
107 Id. at 448. 
108 Id. at 449. 
109 Id. at 435. 
110 Id. 
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along with the year of publication and the name of the author.111 
Until the 1970s, notice requirements were enforced with absolute 
strictness.  As with registration, “technical failure to satisfy notice 
requirements when a work was published could work immediate, 
permanent forfeiture of all copyright protection under both state 
and federal law.”112 
Today, copyright formalities are more flexible, but still 
crucial for authors who wish to protect their rights.  For example, 
although the notice requirement is now optional (a result of the 
U.S.’s attempt to conform to international standards), lack of 
notice can lead to lowered statutory damages.113 Similarly, while 
formal registration and deposit are no longer strict requirements for 
copyrightability,114 both are demanded of authors who wish to 
bring infringement suits.115 
It is plain to see that Congress has long compelled authors 
to affirmatively assert their rights.  Legislative history shows that a 
primary reason behind this policy was to maximize the number of 
works in the public domain.  A House Report printed in 1976 
explicitly stated that historically, a principal function of notice was 
that “[i]t has the effect of placing in the public domain a substantial 
body of published material that no one is interested in 
copyrighting.”116 Maximizing the effectiveness of a system by 
involving those who do not assert their rights is a concept that has 
appeared in every section of this article.  This theme will later be 
discussed with respect to Google Book Search.  For now, however, 
history makes one thing boldly clear: Authors have always had to 
act to inhibit infringement. 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 436 
113 See 17 U.S.C. § 401(d), § 402(d) (“If a notice of copyright in the form and 
position specified by this section appears on the published copy or copies to 
which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight 
shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent 
infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
114 Id. at § 408. 
115 Id. at § 411 (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United 
States work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been 
made in accordance with this title.”). 
116 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 143-44, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. 
News 5659, 5759-60 
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B. ‘Robots.txt’ as an Opt-Out 
 Authors must affirmatively act to protect their copyrights 
online.  In its youth, the Internet was much like the untamed 
American West:117 It was a place of great promise, but very 
difficult to navigate.  Users could only visit websites they already 
knew the names of (i.e., http://www.ebay.com),  but were unable to 
easily locate new websites.  This problem gave birth to the 
business of Internet directories and search engines.  Like intrepid 
explorers of the old west, search computer programs journeyed out 
onto the digital frontier, and made records of all the websites they 
found.  Internet users could then find new websites by telling 
search engines just what they were looking for. 
 To be useful, however, search engines had to copy some of 
the content they found online.  This clearly raised a copyright 
dilemma:  How could search companies make information easier 
to find without trammeling on the copyrights of website owners?  
Although online photographs and literary works are fixed in digital 
form, they enjoy the full protections of Copyright.118 That a work 
might be stored on a sheet of parchment, a magnetic tape, a 
compact disc, or a web server’s hard drive makes little difference 
for purposes of copyrightability.119 
Ultimately, the problem was solved with an opt-out scheme 
known as, Robot Exclusion Headers (“REH”).120 The technology 
 
117 Many people have likened the early Internet to the frontier west, both for its 
sense of promise and lawlessness.  The phrase “electronic frontier” was most 
famously adopted by The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit 
organization which seeks to preserve personal freedoms in the digital domain.  
The Electronic Frontier Foundation was founded in 1990 by Mitch Kapor, 
former president of Lotus Development Corporation, John Perry Barlow, 
Wyoming cattle rancher and lyricist for the Grateful Dead, and John Gilmore, an 
early employee of Sun Microsystems.  A History of Protecting Freedom Where 
Law and Technology Collide, (The Electronic Frontier Foundation),  at 
http://www.eff.org/about/history.php. 
118 A work need not be readily perceivable for copyright protection to exist.  
What matters is that a work can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”  17 
U.S.C. § 102(a).  See also, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp 
714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
119 Id.
120 See generally MARTIJN KOSTNER, A STANDARD FOR ROBOT EXCLUSION 
(1994), at http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html (detailing the robot 
exclusion standard). 
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is less exotic than the name implies. REHs are brief computer 
commands which tell search engines what they shouldn’t copy 
from websites.  Copyright owners who don’t want their material 
indexed store these commands in a text file named, “robots.txt” 
which lies at the top-level of a web server’s directory structure.  
Today, this is the most common method of preventing unwanted 
copying by search engines.121 
A quick concrete example of an REH can be found at 
photo.net, the popular photography website: 
 
Disallow: /pvt 
Disallow: /shared 
Disallow: /photodb 
Disallow: /bboard 
Disallow: /learn 
Disallow: /travel 
Disallow: /tv 
Disallow: /gallery122 
The “disallow” command is read by almost all search engines as 
the website owner’s desire to opt-out of having their data 
copied,123 and the short words preceded by the “/” character are the 
names of protected folders. 
 As the example shows, authors can be very specific in 
telling search engines exactly what not to index.  For example, a 
website operator who has two folders, “public journal” and 
“private diary” can list the latter folder in her robots.txt file to 
prevent it from being copied.  By not naming the “public journal” 
folder, the website owner silently consents to it being copied. 
 This illustrates a unique advantage of the opt-out in the 
context of indexing systems.  Often, copyright holders may wish to 
have some –but not all– of their material included.  If web search 
engines were forced to operate by means of a strict opt-in, it is hard 
to imagine that such fine-grain choices would be possible.  An opt-
in in this realm would require search engines to painstakingly and 
perpetually contact website operators, to ask for permission to 
 
121 See infra note 25.  See also, Eric J. Feigin, Architecture of Consent: Internet 
Protocols and Their Legal Implications, 56 STAN. L. REV. 901, 934 (2003-
2004). 
122 http://photo.net/robots.txt. 
123 Kostner, supra note 120. 
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index copyrighted material.  For practical purposes, strict opt-in 
would be the death of online search. 
 
IV. GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH 
Before analyzing the opt-out issue in Google Book Search, 
it is valuable to explore briefly the purpose and significance of the 
project itself.  A major weakness in traditional book catalogues and 
indices is the fact that readers often don’t know how a book has 
been categorized.  Ignorant of this fact, readers are left to play 
guessing games to find what they are looking for.  The same 
problem exists when searching for information within a single 
work. 
 Google Book Search solves this problem in a novel way.  
Rather than requiring readers to guess the proper category that a 
work has been assigned to, Google’s index allows users to find 
books based on any word or phrase that appears in text.  Users 
enter phrases into the index, and the system presents a list of all 
books that contain those words, as well as vendors selling those 
titles.124 Although some authors ask Google to display a few full 
pages from their books to help entice readers, most books are not 
readable in any true sense.125 All that is provided to help users 
understand the context in which their search appears is a one or 
two-line snippet of text surrounding their search terms.126 By 
allowing the public to locate printed works based on such specific 
criteria,127 the project promises to revolutionize the way people 
find books. 
 
124 See Google Books Library Project, supra note 5 (explaining how Google 
Book Search operates). 
125 Id. Users are not able to read full pages or even paragraphs of copyrighted 
works.  Instead, “snippets” of text are presented to give the user a sense of 
context when viewing an indexed work. 
126 Id.
127 The way an individual conceptualizes information affects the way they search 
for it.  Often, indexes reflect one’s unique appreciation and memory of that 
work.  This fact has been recognized by authors and woven into fictional 
narratives.  For example, in “The Adventure of the Sussex Vampire,” written by 
Sir Arthur Coonan Doyle, the detective Sherlock Holmes searches aloud through 
his own index of past matters:   
“Voyage of the Gloria Scott,” he read. “That was a bad 
business… Victor Lynch, the forger. Venomous lizard or gila. 
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Despite its vast potential as a sales vehicle, some authors 
object to Google Book Search.  These authors claim that, because 
the index relies on the full text of books, it impermissibly infringes 
on their copyrights.128 Google’s early response to these fears was 
to establish a simple opt-out system.129 Authors troubled by the 
inclusion of their works within the Google index can easily visit a 
website and request removal.130 Authors can also opt out prior to 
having their works indexed.131 The opt-out procedure is free, 
easily accessible online, and Google’s instructions are clear.132 In 
response, two large authors’ groups have instituted class action 
lawsuits, claiming Google’s opt-out system represents an unfair 
burden.133 
It’s likely that this legal dispute will center on whether 
Google’s index is protected by the doctrine of fair use.134 
Traditional fair use analysis involves the weighing of four factors: 
(1) the purpose of the defendant’s use, (2) the nature of the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality 
taken by the defendant, (4) the effect of defendant’s use on the 
market for the plaintiff’s work.135 These four factors focus on the 
substantive fairness of a defendant’s use, but they do little to 
 
Remarkable case, that! Vittoria, the circus belle. . . .Vipers. 
Vigors, the Hammersmith wonder. Hullo! Hullo! Good old 
index. You can’t beat it.”   
Another example appears in the book, “Cat’s Cradle,” wherein the author Kurt 
Vonnegut suggests that indexing reflects an individual’s unique perceptions, and 
that a great deal can be learned about a person by the way he indexes a book. It 
seems the fact that we store information differently often leads us down different 
paths in searching for new information. 
128 See, e.g., Press Release, The Author’s Guild Sues Google, Citing “Massive 
Copyright Infringement” (Sept. 20, 2005), supra note 3. 
129 See Information for Publishers, supra note 7. 
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Press Release, The Author’s Guild, “Author’s Guild Sues Google, Citing 
“Massive Copyright Infringement” (Sept. 20, 2005), supra note 3; Press 
Release, The Association of American Publishers, “Publishers Sue Google Over 
Plans To Digitize Books – Google Print Library Violates Publishers’ and 
Authors’ Rights” (Oct. 19. 2005), available at 
http://www.publishers.org/press/releases.cfm?PressReleaseArticleID=292. 
134 See Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: A Copyright Analysis,
at http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/googleprint.pdf. 
135 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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evaluate the procedural fairness of an opt-out plan.  This article has 
demonstrated that in several major areas of law –including 
copyright– the fairness of opt-outs weighs heavily against the 
unfairness of activities that some find objectionable.  As the 
discussion below will show, Google Book Search is a strong case 
for the inclusion of procedural considerations in fair use. 
 
A. Lessons from Contract and Privacy Law 
This article began with a discussion of negative option 
agreements used by mail order businesses.  Introduced by the 
Book-of-the-Month Club in the 1920s and still widely in use, this 
form of marketing places an unusual burden upon consumers to 
affirmatively communicate their desire not to accept goods and 
services.  Negative option agreements have a demonstrated 
potential to harm contractual freedoms. 
 The National Do-Not-Call Registry is a more recent 
example of a similar scenario in the realm of telemarketing.  
Where negative option agreements burden contractual freedom, 
telemarketing threatens privacy.  The older practice utilizes the 
postal system, while the more recent system exploits the power of 
the telephone. 
 Despite their potential for harm, both negative option 
contracts and telemarketing remain legal.  As examined earlier, 
this is largely due to the fact that both systems utilize opt-outs.  
Consumers presented with negative option offers can easily 
communicate their refusals to merchants.  Similarly, anyone can 
register their telephone number for free on the National Do-Not-
Call Registry to avoid receiving calls from telemarketers.136 Both 
opt-out procedures are free, easily accessible, and simple to use.  
The fairness of this procedure dilutes the unfair and objectionable 
aspects of both business practices.137 
Further, opt-outs benefit consumers by involving those 
who, through apathy or indifference, do not assert themselves.  
Some subset of individuals in this ambivalent group is likely to 
eventually benefit from the goods or services they are offered.138 
136 See The Federal Do-Not-Call Registry, supra note 55. 
137 See infra pp. 8-14. 
138 The presumed strength behind telemarketing lies in its ability to sell items to 
consumers who wouldn’t otherwise purchase those goods. 
MATTIOLI OPTING OUT 
34 OPTING OUT 
This involvement directly benefits businesses, possibly leading to 
secondary benefits in the form of lower prices, and higher quality 
goods and services. 
 Finally, opt-outs in the negative option and telemarketing 
domains save businesses search costs.  Under opt-in regimes, 
businesses are more likely to spend money motivating potential 
consumers to involve themselves.  As the formal economic model 
presented in Section I illustrates139, the cost of motivating the 
public can be high, and it can safely be assumed that the process 
takes time.  If these transaction costs outweigh a business’s desired 
profits, valuable business activity will be lost.  In contrast, opt-out 
systems spare businesses transaction costs by automatically 
introducing products and services to those who wouldn’t otherwise 
feel motivated enough to opt in.  Our legal system recognizes the 
fact that these benefits to consumers and businesses far outweigh 
the nominal burden of opting out. 
 Comparing these examples to Google Book Search, we 
follow the historical trend in communications technology from the 
postal system to the telephone to the Internet.  Like earlier 
examples, Google is a business acting upon a large number of 
individuals.140 Where negative option marketing threatened 
contractual rights and telemarketing threatened privacy rights, 
Google’s activity places a burden on copyrights.  Functionally, 
Google’s opt-out is similar to the National Do-Not-Call Registry. 
Like that service, the opt-out form is presented on a webpage that 
has been widely publicized.141 The form is easy to find, easy to 
use, and free.  Further, it permits both prospective and 
retrospective opt-outs.  Understandably, Google confirms the 
identity of copyright holders who opt-out.142 No matter how 
substantively objectionable Google Book Search might appear to 
authors, the opt-out procedure is certainly fair by comparable 
standards.  With these fundamental similarities in mind, we now 
 
139 See infra p. 13. 
140 Currently, Google is the world’s most popular search engine.  As their 
website states: “Google is the world’s largest search engine and through its 
partnerships . . . response to more search queries than any other service online.”  
Google Corporate Information: Quick Profile at 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/corporate/facts.html 
141 Google Print Library Project Exclusion Registration, supra note 4. 
142 Id. Not doing so could lead to the dishonest practice of competing authors 
removing each other’s books from Google Book Search to hinder sales. 
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consider whether Google’s opt-out shares the economic benefits of 
previous examples. 
 Google Book Search’s opt-out appears to present benefits 
to businesses and consumers by securing the involvement of 
apathetic individuals.  Authors who might feel initially ambivalent 
toward Google Book Search have the opportunity to be included 
by default.  Just as in previous examples, some of these individuals 
will benefit from the service - perhaps through increased sales and 
exposure online.  This additional involvement will promote greater 
book sales, and make Google’s index a stronger system for other 
authors.  In turn, this will likely lead to secondary economic 
benefits for Google and advertisers.  
 By providing authors with the right to opt out, as opposed 
to requiring an opt-in, Google avoids the cost of locating and 
contacting thousands of copyright holders.  The time and money it 
would take to locate authors and convince them to opt-in would 
likely weaken the book index considerably.  If these transaction 
costs were higher than Google’s desired profits, the book index 
itself would likely be abandoned. Thus, an opt-in could result in 
the end of a valuable service. 
 Google Book Search is the most recent in a series of opt-
out business plans that have threatened substantive legal rights.  
The fairness of this opt-out plan is a counterweight against its 
allegedly unjust use of copyrighted works.  As in telemarketing 
and negative option agreements, Google’s opt-out benefits 
business and consumers by guaranteeing the involvement of 
indifferent parties, preventing needless search costs. 
 
B. Lessons from Class Action Rules 
Turning to class action suits, we shift focus from economic 
to social benefits.  As discussed in Section II, a major reason 
behind the 1966 switch from opt-in to opt-out class action 
enrolment rules was the problem of one-way intervention.143 
However, the societal benefits of opting-out in the class action 
arena far surpass this humble goal.  As in the business context, opt-
out enrollment creates collective action benefits by including those 
 
143 See infra p. 22. 
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who don’t respond to class notifications.  This added inertia makes 
opt-out class action suits powerful tools of justice. 
 Google Book Search possesses a similar potential to benefit 
society.  As the index grows, readers will have an unprecedented 
opportunity to learn about books by means not previously available 
to them.  Researchers will be able to pinpoint subject matter that 
was traditionally hard to find.  The technology will also vastly 
broaden the horizons of younger readers more comfortable with 
search engines than old-fashioned library indexes. 
 Publishers and authors will reap advantages as well.  As 
Tim O’Reilly, the well-known publisher of computer books, 
recently wrote in a op-ed piece for the New York Times: 
 
A search engine for books will be revolutionary in 
its benefits.  Obscurity is a far greater threat to 
authors than copyright infringement, or even 
outright piracy . . . . Google promises an alternative 
to the obscurity imposed on most books.  It makes 
that great corpus of less-than-bestseller accessible to 
all.  By pointing to a huge body of print works 
online, Google will offer a way to promote books 
that publishers have thrown away, creating an 
opportunity for readers to track them down and buy 
them.144 
As in class action suits, this force for social good can only 
operate successfully with the collective action benefits that come 
from opting-out.  Under an opt-in regime, Google would be forced 
to spend large sums of money searching for and communicating 
with rights holders.  At the very least, this lost time and money 
would make Google Book Search a less powerful tool for society.  
These costs might be so expensive as to make the project 
nonviable.  The massive loss to readers and copyright holders 
would vastly overshadow the single paltry benefit an opt-in would 
give reluctant authors. 
 
144 Search and Rescue, Tim O’Reilly, New York Times, September 28, 2005 
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C. Precedent in Copyright Law 
Contrary to the Association of American Publishers’ claim 
that Google Book Search turns traditional copyright law “on its 
ear,”145 copyright law has long placed burdens on authors to assert 
their rights.  The formal notice, deposit and registration 
requirements demand authors to affirmatively act in order to enjoy 
the full benefits of their copyrights.  Although these requirements 
have been weakened since their inception, they still place a duty on 
those interested in defending their copyrights. 
 Even more striking is the fact that opting-out is the primary 
way copyright holders protect their online works from indexing 
systems like Google’s.  Using Robot Exclusion Headers, authors 
can specify which material they don’t want search engines to copy.  
The indexing of online works would probably not be feasible under 
any other arrangement. 
 The argument that Google Book Search should adopt an 
opt-in suggests that copyright law should afford authors of printed 
works greater protection than authors of online works already 
receive.  It’s unclear why this should be so.  While some might 
argue that those who publish their works online somehow assume 
the risk of being indexed, this does not seem to be so:  Both online 
and print authors share their work with the public, and digital 
works are in no way less worthy of copyright protection.  The only 
true difference between works published online and those 
published on paper lies in a method of distribution.  There is no 
reason why this fact should lead to disparate treatment of two 
otherwise identical groups.  Ultimately, it is clear that the burden 
to affirmatively act is rooted in copyright’s history, and has already 
been adopted in a context nearly identical to Google Book Search. 
 
D. Procedural Fair Use 
In the situations reviewed in this article, the opt-out is more 
than a mere courtesy or a gift to those who want no involvement.  
It is a major force of legitimacy and fairness.  Without the opt-out 
procedure, many of the activities discussed in previous sections 
would be deemed unfair. 
 
145 Press Release, Association of American Publishers, Google Library Project 
Raises Serious Questions for Publishers and Authors, supra note 10. 
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Google Book Search is a clearly analogous situation.  Here, 
a central actor acts upon a large group of individuals.  The rights of 
some are slightly encumbered in the face of economic and social 
benefits.  At the heart of this project lies an opt-out.   
 However, the fair use doctrine, which will most likely be 
the major test of Google Book Search’s legality doesn’t account 
for procedures like opting-out.  The fair use doctrine requires a 
court to consider: 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.146 
These factors point to fairness in substance, but do not account for 
fairness in procedure.  With no legislative framework in place, the 
danger exists that courts will ignore opt-outs, or treat the procedure 
inconsistently, or as an afterthought.  As the examples from this 
article demonstrate, opt-outs can be central to the legitimacy of 
business practices – not side notes. 
 Copyright law must consider and weigh the procedural 
fairness of opt-outs.  Ideally, this could be accomplished through 
an amendment to the Copyright Act.  The inclusion of procedural 
fairness in Section 107 would make it clear that, like other fair use 
factors, opt-outs counter-balance what otherwise might be 
considered objectionable uses of copyrighted material.  Because 
opting out deals with the nature of a defendant’s use, it might be 
appended to the first fair use factor.  Thus, an updated version of 
factor (1) might appear as: 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes, and including the 
existence of mitigating procedures such as opt-outs. 
 
146 17 U.S.C. § 107 
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Ultimately, the inclusion of this new factor would provide courts 
with a clear means of measuring a critically important aspect of a 
defendant’s use of copyrighted material. 
 In time, more businesses are likely to index analog works 
by means similar those employed by Google.  Much like the early 
days of telemarketing, company specific opt-out procedures might 
place an unfair burden on rights holders to opt out from a multitude 
of databases.  To solve this problem, one can imagine a centralized 
opt-out procedure similar to the National Do-Not-Call Registry.  A 
national “Do-Not-Index” registry of this sort would provide rights 
holders with an easy means of opting out of multiple indexing 
projects.  Copyright holders could either sign up online, or simply 
indicate their preference when registering their work. 
 For future works, opting out would be even easier to 
accomplish.  The analog equivalent to a “robots.txt” statement 
would forgo the need to register future works in an opt-out 
database.  Just as copyright holders provide notice with the © (the 
letter C inside a circle) figure, the desire not to have a work copied 
for indexing purposes could be indicated with a  (slash in a 
circle) symbol.  This symbol (or one like it) would be an extremely 
cheap and serviceable means of opting-out. 
 
E. Conclusion 
Opting out has been adopted in several major areas of the 
law.  It adds fairness and legitimacy to marketing and sales 
practices, while generating economic activity valuable to 
businesses and consumers.  Properly administrated, it does so at 
little or no cost to those who wish to opt out.  By marshaling the 
masses that don’t respond to class notification, the opt-out system 
is also a tool for justice in the class action area.  Opting out is 
rooted in copyright’s history and has already been adopted in the 
online context. 
 There is a common structure to all of the scenarios 
reviewed in this article.  In each case, a central actor threatens the 
rights of a large class of individuals.  Negative option agreements 
interfere with contractual rights.  Telemarketing infringes privacy 
rights.  Class action procedures implicate due process 
considerations.  In all such cases, however, those who fear harm 
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have an easy means of avoiding it, and rules have been developed 
which dictate standards for notice and proper administration, 
ensuring that opt-outs are fair and relatively costless. 
 The present situation concerning Google is closely 
analogous.  The importance of opt-outs in contract, privacy, and 
class actions demonstrates that Google’s opt-out program is more 
than a courtesy to authors;  it substantially adds to the fairness and 
legitimacy of Google Book Search.  While some authors complain 
of the burden an opt-out imposes, copyright law has long placed 
burdens on authors through formal registration, notice and deposit 
requirements.  Further, opting out is already a dominant mode of 
choice in protecting works published online. 
 The quality of a meal cannot be determined solely by its 
ingredients, but how those ingredients are prepared.  The same is 
true in determining the legitimacy of large-scale business and legal 
actions - fairness is a product of both substance and procedure.  
Recognizing this, major areas of the law endorse opt-outs.  Google 
Book Search is not the first, and certainly will not be the last 
digital indexing service to raise copyright concerns.  The 
controversy stirred by this project exposes copyright’s lack of 
recognition for fair procedures like opt-outs.  Valuable economic 
activity and important social gains will be realized through the 
recognition in copyright law of procedural fair use. 
